Army Personnel Transformation
Achieving "Parallel Evolution"
Briefing to the HASC

Don Vandergriff, Major U.S. Army

10 March 2004

Where Have I Been/Briefed?

- SEC Army HON Mr. White
- Congressman Bartlett
- Congressman Skelton
- GEN Keane Vice Chief
- LTG Ohle, DCSPER
- LTG LeMoyne, DCSPER
- LTG Hagenbeck, DCSPER
- LTG Helmly, Chief Army Reserve
- LTG Riggs, Objective Force Task Force
- MG Anderson, Human Resources Command
- BG Byrne, Enlisted Management Division, Chief Stabilization TF

- "On Call" for GEN Schoomaker, CSA
- Senate Finance Committee staffers
- House staffers (Rayburn building 14 June 2002)
- Naval War College (twice), Marine Corps Staff College, and Marine Corps Expeditionary School, Staff of National Defense University
- Swiss War College
- Think tanks to include RAND, IDA, CSIS
- Numerous OSD/DA Task Forces, Staffs, Colonels and below
- Written books, edited books, 30 articles, columns

"You cannot have Transformation until you transform the personnel system"
Donald Vandergriff to General Keane
Army Vice Chief of Staff, 23 June 2002

Briefing Points

- **"Why Change"**
- **COHORT**
- **Questions for the Army**
- **Tradeoffs?**
- **Preparing Leaders**
- **Training Stabilized Units**
- **Back Ups**

Why Change?

- **Army moving from a Mobilization based doctrinal force to an Expeditionary, forced entry Army:**
    - Higher tempo and ferocity of combat will subject soldiers to unprecedented levels of stress
    - Soldiers and smaller units in the information-saturated battlefield will have to execute more sophisticated tactics—can only master through repeated, demanding training
    - Deployment times will be quicker, little or no time for "build up and train up"
        - A pool of units beyond SOF must be always ready
        - Units must have down time as well in order to pass lessons learned and rebuild
        - Evolution of war demand experts at tactical, operational and strategic levels, not "jack of all trades."

"We paid-and continue to pay-a heavy price for such rotations. Even an extraordinary and well-prepared officer takes time to learn his or her job; Often it appears that we rotate our officers just as they really hit their stride."

Mr. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, 1990

Evolution of Debate: WWI – Current

- **CONUS 15 percent turnover rate of personnel per quarter (SEC White)**
- **Two conflicting competing chains of command (John Tillson IDA)**
  - One, Joint/Service command—manages units
  - Invisible chain—personnel system, supported by deeply embedded attitudes and behavior—is responsible for managing individuals, creating the best, most capable individual warriors
- **First, has clear most important set of responsibilities. It loses virtually every confrontation between it and the invisible chain of command**

"It is expensive to force officers through the ranks and a waste of experience to get rid of others."

Congressman Sam Nunn

The Current and Future Challenges

- **Manage unit cohesion and stabilization by default—Stop loss and Stop Move:**
    - Desert Shield and Storm (1990-91)
    - Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-02)
    - Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)
- **In each case, unit manning efforts were superimposed on a personnel system that remained, fundamentally, focused on the individual rather than unit effectiveness**
- **After Action Reviews, particularly by the 3rd Infantry Division contribute their success to the stabilization of leaders and led in the 8 months prior to crossing the Line of Departure in March 2003**

"Why do it [unit manning] by default?"

Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, 14 April 2003

# Two Factors Undermined COHORT

- **Army-wide failure to understand COHORT**
  - No commanders intent or vision
  - No agreement on COHORT goals
  - Major components to make work did not get resolved, bureaucracy was able to wait out
- **An officer and NCO management system that was divorced from the unit manning system**
  - Junior enlisted only
  - Development of individual seen separate from gaining experience with unit by seeing "what right looks like"

"The worst COHORT unit was better than the best IRS-filled unit."
Dr. Faris Kirkland, 1989
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research

Questions for the Army

Questions

- **How Much Stability?**
  - **Should leadership cadre participate in initial training?**
  - **Three year stabilization-what else aligns with that cycle?**
  - **What key positions should be stabilized?**
  - **How will recruits be selected as replacement plugs?**

Questions (cont.)

- **How to Reduce Internal Turbulence?**
- **Will steps be taken to curb erosion of unit stability from the "borrowing" of manpower?**
- **Will there be incentives for leaders to stay on—and for first term soldiers to reenlist—to form new cadre?**

Questions (cont.)

- **Unit Rotation to Germany and Korea as well as Iraq, Kosovo, etc…Korea is the PCS driver for the rest of CONUS**
  - This will be in conflict with CONUS life cycle based units and maintaining IRS filled units overseas
  - Good for evolution to expeditionary Army, to be expert in deploying overseas
- **Force Stabilization in the context of BRAC. Consolidate as many TDA and TOE positions in the same place**
  - Move Armor School to Hood for example. Will assist in Home basing. Officers and NCOs could rotate to these schools from units and back

Questions (cont.)

- **Force Stabilization and Life Cycle for the reserve component. E-Brigades and ARNG divisional brigades on a life cycle model high state of readiness one year in three**
- **Track soldiers as they leave the life cycle unit. Soldiers on IRR could be tracked, brought back in an emergency to a unit they just left**

Questions (cont.)

- **What is Impact on Officer career management?**
  - Lot of decisions to be made. One of the fundamental reasons COHORT was undermined-foundation of policies can be traced to Progressive era and post WWII concerns over mobilization for WWIII
  - Command during entire life cycle. One way to handle the problem is to allow majors to be company commanders for example
  - Given the complexities—high demands of a life cycle unit—the Army will need most experienced commanders at all levels
  - Culture will have to adapt. Professional development becomes leader development can be achieved in life cycle or at professional school. Officer is not "punished" for missing professional school if in a life cycle and they come up for promotion
  - First test to culture will be when officers come up for promotion, missed a professional career school, but still got promoted due to being successful with a life cycle unit
  - Officer Management system needs to be torn down, and rebuilt beginning with the accessions system (how to produce officers)

Tradeoffs?

- **The new manning and home basing initiatives will come in conflict with established beliefs and accepted norms (policies and laws)**
  - Filling of administrative and support positions
  - Career, professional requirements

Preparing Leaders

- How will training for officers and NCOs—including precommissioning training—be changed to better equip leaders at the company and below?

- How, and for How long will the cadre of a newly changed unit train itself before joining its fill of first-termers?

- Slowing down "command driven moves for career development" based on generalist theories

Training Stabilized Units

- **WRAIR validated that as units stay together, they desire more challenges**
    - Must evolve our current training doctrine to meet this demand (Tillson)
    - Resources are not available to provide a CTC on every post, might turn to evolving simulation technology (Tillson)
    - Decentralizing training management to give company/team commanders more autonomy (Wong study)
- **Readiness Reporting System or USR, must measure cohesion and stability**

Conclusion

- **Army is implementing the boldest personnel changes since Secretary of War Elihu Root's reforms 1899-1904**
- **Avoid "COHORT II," which was a smaller unit centric program in a larger individual centric program. It is bound to fail**
- **Achieve "Parallel Evolution" is a generational change, 10 years or so; but as Army CSA has begun changing several institutions at one time in order to carry them through his tenure**
- **Identify the obstacles, communicate the pay off to the force, educate the leaders and followers**
- **Personnel Reforms:**
    - Sustains the force beyond the campaign
    - Must create a smaller officer corps
    - Must make accessions into officer corps harder
    - Turn the personnel system into a unit centric system
    - Must educate leaders from the beginning on the value of unit stabilization and unit manning

Back Up

U.S. vs. German Performance-Its more than Unit Stability

- **Earlier Studies focused on German performance, kill ratios, etc…**
  - U.S. performed because it had incredible fire superiority
  - Germans maintained unit rotations to end
- **U.S. downturn of performance was not solely due to individual replacement system (IRS)**
- **Reality is the U.S. turned out good units by late 44-45**
- **Most successful commanders managed "units by default," in spite of the IRS system, 79th ID, 88th ID are examples**
- **Performance was also a leader issue. U.S. had to come from behind the Germans to develop professional leaders by late 1944**

"After 1871, American and European armies tried to copy the German system, while many succeeded organizationally/structurally; none succeeded culturally because they lacked the requisite trust needed to empower subordinates to Make rapid decisions without authority"

Revolution in Human Affairs, 2000

Korea and Vietnam

- Individual rotation in both wars was based on the concern for psychological fitness of soldiers from studies in WWII
- Force structure prevented unit rotation in both wars
- Initially, U.S. deployed good units to Vietnam, but as war grew unpopular, this changed
- Both leadership and IRS had an impact on unit effectiveness, not solely the personnel system
- Rotating commanders at six months had significant impact on unit performance and trust between leaders and led

"The results of these policies [derivatives of up or out] created an Army
That was under-trained, ill equipped and poorly led."

Colonel Carl Bernard, 2 x DSCs
Platoon Leader Task Force Smith

Evolution of Debate: WWI – Current (cont.)

- **Personnel Theories of moving people and rapid promotions (up or out) derived from Progressive era "Tangible Incentives," and "Ethical Egotism" state that only way to retain the best is to promote them and award them with more power (responsibility)**
- **Conflicts with ethics of traditional professionals—where entry into the profession is up front, difficult. The profession polices its own ranks to maintain standards; yet, it creates an environment of trust and autonomy so essential to an effective Army**

"Elihu Root believed in the theories of Frederick Taylor [the father of replacement parts and top down management] and was promoting them on the floor of Congress."

Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs
From Congressional Records

The Evolution of Warfare

- **1st Generation:** ***Driven by Ideas & Aristocratic Culture, Culminating in the "Nation-of-Arms"***
  - Linear Tactics of Column and Line -- Regularity Driven by Culture & Technology
  - Operational Art - Intuitive -- Napoleon's use of Time & Space to Set Up Decisive Battle
- **2nd Generation:** ***Attrition Warfare, Driven by Technology***
  - Materialschlacht or Industrial War of Attrition - Civil War to WWI and Most of Allies in
  - 2nd WWII (exceptions like Patton, JS Wood)
  - Linear Tactics - Regularity Driven by Technology (Indirect Arty, Machine Guns,
  - Barbed Wire Gave Advantage to Defense)
  - Operational Art - Procure Success from Top Down: Move Around Defense to Destroy Adversary
  - in a Battle of Encirclement
  - Space-Time Decisions SYNCHRONIZED, 1st Moltke, then by Petain, Based on
 - Mobilization and RR (e.g., Schlieffen Plan and Methodical Battle)

Evolution of Warfare (cont.)

- **3rd Generation: _Maneuver Warfare, Driven by Ideas_ (Army has at least a foot into this)**
  - Infiltration tactics - Blitzkrieg -USMC & OODA Loop
  - Nonlinear Tactics - Evolve Penetrations based on Ideas of Surfaces & gaps, Recon Pull, Multiple Thrusts,
  - Mission Tactics & Decentralized, all harmonized, by Ideas of Commander's Intent &Schwerpunkt, etc
  - Operational Art - Dismember & Collapse Adversary by penetrating Mind-Time-Space Frame of Reference
  - (ie., Penetrate his observation-Orientation-Decision-Action Loops, (Boyd))
- **4th Generation: _Irregular Warfare -- Ideas (?)_ (Special Forces understand it)**
  - Revolutionary (Lawrence - Mao - Giap) - Non Sate Actors (Ethnic/Tribal/Religious - Gang - Terrorist -etc.)
  - Tactical Penetration Techniques still developing, but are clearly spreading w/unknown implications
  - Operational Art - Collapse Adversary by Bypassing Army & Attacking Population and Culture
  - Al Queda-non-state organization

The Vision of Transformation

Capability

Vision

The "RMA"

Today — Risk

Represents Trade-offs
- *Crews learn new techniques*
- *Units learn new tactics*
- *Organizational Transitions ("fenced" units)*

Capability Overmatch

Threat Capability

Time

From Mark Lewis briefing

The Result:

Capability

Vision

The "RMA"

Effect of a Declining
Effectiveness Index

Today

$\Delta = ?$

Capability Overmatch

Threat Capability

Time

What is "Parallel Evolution?"

- **COHORT demonstrated that the Army is an integrated, interdependent system**
  - Major change in one element of the system can not succeed without parallel changes in other elements
- **Parallel Evolution is the process of making coordinated changes throughout the Army system in response to changes in warfare**
  - Army is currently structured and manned for 2nd Generation warfare while war has evolved to 4th Generation; or, mobilization vice ready now
- **16 Initiatives represent the Army effort at Parallel Evolution-the largest since the reforms of Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1899-1904**

"You cannot change a large organization unless you do it in the first year!"
Jack Welch, CEO GE

Historical Examples of Parallel Evolution

- **Prussian to German Military 1809-1942**

- **Israeli Defense Force 1947-1973**

- **U.S. Army 1973-1990 (attempts at evolving the personnel system failed)**

The first two saw significant, but evolutionary (not revolutionary) changes to their personnel systems to support an evolving Maneuver Warfare Doctrine

"The failure to reform the personnel system in light of what we were doing in other areas, undermined all our efforts to achieve significant reform."

General Shy Meyer (ret.) CSA 1979-1983

Risks

- **If Parallel Evolution does not occur:**
  - **One sixth of the active duty force turns over annually**
  - **More so, those departing include nearly half of those soldiers who are completing their first term, most of the trigger pullers**
  - **Unit manning focused on current life cycle concentrates on personnel turbulence in 20-25 % of the maneuver units**
  - **Change doctrine, force structure that focuses on all units partially ready vice a percentage at cutting edge readiness. One executes attrition doctrine, one maneuver doctrine**
  - **Unit Manning will stand in conflict with the above, individual centric vs. unit centric personnel system**

"If knew then what I know now, I would have spent more time on changing the personnel system."

General Shy Meyer, 28 January 1998

Risks (cont.)

- **Maintaining a force structure that has evolved from our mobilization doctrine past**
- **Officer management system in conflict with needs of unit life cycle and home basing initiatives**
- **Imbalance between active component quality and what we are asking the reserves to do**

"We have created a culture of conflict. We say and write one thing.
Then we act out something in total contrast. This is what is frustrating
to many officers and NCO who want to do it right."
Colonel to Vandergriff, June 2001