

Task Force on  
**A Unified Security Budget  
For the United States**

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*The members of the Task Force support this report as one positive proposal illustrating a way to rebalance the security budget, without necessarily endorsing each program proposal within it.*

# A Unified Security Budget for the United States

## Executive Summary

Since September 11, 2001, the question of how to provide for our security has loomed large over our national life. Many of the Bush administration's answers to this question have come under intense challenge—from the doctrine of preventive war to the development of new designs for “usable” nuclear weapons to the choice of war with Iraq as the centerpiece of its war on terrorism. But until recently one aspect of the administration's strategy has gone virtually unchallenged, namely its military budgets and the spending priorities contained within them. From 2000 to 2004, these budgets have increased by more than 50%. Congress has approved each of these budgets, and virtually the entire menu of programs specified in them, with hardly a whisper of debate.

Ever-increasing budget deficit projections have finally begun to make security budget priorities a permissible topic of conversation among lawmakers. In mid-February the House Speaker declared all parts of the budget “on the table” for cuts, including the military, and soon thereafter the administration abruptly canceled the Army's long-running *Comanche* helicopter program.

The Task Force on *A Unified Security Budget for the United States*, drawing on the knowledge of analysts with expertise in different dimensions of the security challenge, welcomes the opening of this overdue debate, and offers this contribution to help point it in the right direction. Among its findings:

**Key finding:** Despite promises of a comprehensive approach to fighting terrorism, the Bush administration has concentrated its resources overwhelmingly on its military forces, at the expense of other security tools. **Bush's 2005 budget would spend *seven times as much on the military as on homeland security and all other forms of non-military security programs combined.***

**Key finding:** The Bush military budget is being spent on a force structure that does not match today's security challenges, because it is designed for a cold-war-style large-scale conventional challenge that we no longer face.

**Key finding:** Fixing the problem will require a unified approach to security that integrates nonmilitary tools into our security strategy and rebalances military forces for today's security challenges.

This document provides a working model for how this could be done, without reducing overall spending levels on security, and without increasing the deficit. It shows how funding can be shifted within military accounts for an overall saving of \$51 billion. And it outlines \$52 billion in

spending on non-military measures. **This shift would change the current 7 to 1 ratio of military to non-military security tools to 3 to 1—a better balance for the U.S.’ long-term security needs.**

**Key finding:** The administration’s decision to cut the Comanche program was a good start. The report identifies ten other programs, including the F-22 fighter and DDX destroyer, which could be safely cut or reconfigured to free up \$56 billion in resources for other neglected security priorities.

**Key finding:** \$5 billion should be added to military accounts to rectify military equipment shortfalls identified in Iraq, such as improved flak jackets, truck armor reinforcements and helicopter protection systems, and to restructure and retrain forces for small- and medium-scale peace and stability operations and counterterrorist missions.

**Key finding:** The report recommends reallocating \$6 billion to strengthen crucial nonmilitary dimensions of our security including diplomacy, nonproliferation programs, and support for international peace and stability operations.

**Key finding:** In a 2002 speech President Bush identified development assistance as a security tool, linking the desperate resort to terrorism with the hopelessness of persistent poverty. This unified security budget recommends a \$10 billion increase in US development assistance, and outlines key reforms in development policy.

**Key finding:** The remainder of the report’s recommended savings are allocated to addressing key deficits in homeland security, including increased funding for “first responders” to a terrorist attack.

It’s possible to rebalance our national security budget, filling in its missing military and nonmilitary pieces, without increasing its overall bottom line. The result would be military forces better prepared for actual deployments, nonmilitary tools better deployed to address the sources of threat, and a net gain in security for our nation.

## A Unified Security Budget for the United States

Security took on a new meaning for Americans after Sept. 11, 2001. The worst international terrorist attack in history was also the first to cost numerous lives on the American mainland. Since 9/11, Americans have naturally felt more vulnerable, and have set a higher priority on making America more secure.

In response to this challenge, Congress increased the U.S. military budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 by \$49.6 billion, which exceeded the total military budget of every other nation on earth.<sup>1</sup> As the budget deficit tops \$500 billion, the administration's 2005 budget projects military spending of \$2.2 trillion over the next five years. These figures do not include the cost of actual military operations and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan, which now exceed \$166 billion.

The question is whether all this money is being spent wisely on priorities that will do the most to increase our security. We argue that it is not.

Why? Three reasons. First, the money has been spent on a force structure that does not match today's security threats. Second, a major portion of the force has been committed to the wrong mission. And third, these increases have come at the expense of spending on other tools, in addition to military forces, that we need to make us secure.

- ***Mismatched forces.*** Our military is still dominated by an obsolete conventional and nuclear structure, designed to counter the least likely threat: a large-scale conventional challenge. As a result, the United States is burdened with a very expensive but misdirected military prepared for large-scale warfare rather than the challenges and operations that American forces now face with increasing strain. The dangers we face today come less from a potential superpower rival and more from failing states that have the potential to destabilize entire regions and to become magnets for transnational terrorist groups.
- ***Overstretched forces.*** Americans now know, as they were not told going in, that waging war on Iraq was intended as the first phase of a grand strategy to remake the Middle East. It is by no means clear that the U.S. public has either the desire or the means to support such a strategy. It is, however, now clear that Iraq posed no imminent threat to U.S. security, and had no connection to al Qaeda. The ongoing conflict there is now absorbing troop strength that should be available to counter the real threats to our security.
- ***Neglected security tools.*** Following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, President Bush promised a comprehensive response. It would include the offensive security tools of military force. But it would also include the defensive tools of homeland security, including law enforcement measures to bring terrorists to justice, border and aviation security, physical and cyber protection of critical infrastructure, and public health and safety improvements.

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<sup>1</sup> *Analysis of Fiscal 2003 Defense Authorization Conference Report*, Council for a Livable World, Nov. 18, 2002 and *Facts on the Military Budget*, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, June 13, 2003, [www.armscontrolcenter.org/budget/fy03facts.html](http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/budget/fy03facts.html).

It would also include preventive measures, including aid to prevent humanitarian and economic crises, and to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the three years that followed, however, the money flowed overwhelmingly to fund the offensive response. Of the cumulative \$240 billion increase for these three kinds of security spending from Sept., 11 2001 through 2004, four times as much has gone to offense as to defense, and six times as much for offense as for prevention.<sup>2</sup>

### **The need for a unified security budget**

Part of the problem behind this imbalance in national security funding is that there is no “national security” budget. Spending by numerous different agencies is not brought together in a unified budget category that allows lawmakers to consider all components of security funding as a whole. Hence, the imbalance in resources is obscured, and tradeoffs are not forced between the different programs and tools. Budget presentations and the congressional oversight process could usefully be reorganized to propose, examine, and approve a unified national security budget.

Within such a unified budget it would be possible to reallocate resources, including shifting some from the military tool to the nonmilitary tools of national security, without cutting the overall “national security” budget.

### **Rebalancing the security budget**

The Bush administration proposes to spend seven times as much in 2005 for the military portion of the national security budget as for the nonmilitary portion. Its FY 2005 budget requests \$430 billion (not including the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) for military tools, but only \$62 billion for nonmilitary tools, including international security programs and homeland security. When expected costs of Iraq and Afghanistan are added in, the administration allocates twenty times as much for military forces as for international programs (\$23 billion) and more than ten times as much for military forces as for homeland security programs (\$39 billion).<sup>3</sup>

What follows is an outline of a security budget that corrects these imbalances. It rebalances our military forces to make them more useful for addressing today’s threats. It also increases funding for the neglected security tools that will help us to address problems before they become armed conflicts, and to use multilateral approaches to resolve conflicts when they do occur.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, legislators have nearly abandoned their responsibility to set priorities and make choices on spending for the military. Each year the military budget is passed with virtually no debate. And each year it funds, nearly intact, much of the Cold War force structure, with new systems, new pork barrel projects unrelated to broad national security goals, and with spending on new military operations simply added on top. If these huge military spending increases are

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<sup>2</sup> “Paying for the War on Terrorism: U.S. Security Choices since 9/11,” Cindy Williams, Principal Research Scientist, Security Studies Program, MIT, Paper delivered at ASSA Meetings, San Diego, CA, January 5, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Figure for military tools includes “National Defense” budget category plus international security assistance and minus DoD and DoE nonproliferation funding. Figure for nonmilitary tools includes “International Affairs” budget category plus nonproliferation funding minus international security assistance, and Homeland Security funding minus the portion funded by DoD. *Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, Historical Tables*, p. 85; *Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, Summary Tables*, p. 370.

allowed to continue, and if taxes continue to be cut rather than raised, the increases will continue to bankrupt our national treasury. In the long run, these enormous deficits mortgage our children's and even grandchildren's future, and in the short run risk an international economic crisis and collapse. It is the responsibility of our legislators to spend our money wisely, on our security as on everything else.

The budget outlined below takes the path of fiscal responsibility by laying out a security budget that achieves a zero sum result: it rebalances spending within a broad national security budget without making an overall reduction. It cuts military spending where it can be cut. It refocuses military forces to be more effective. And it increases funding for the security tools outside the Defense Department that have, in recent years, been pared back too far. The result is a budget that will do more than simply "plussing up" the Pentagon's accounts will do to make us, and the rest of the world, more secure. It accomplishes this by focusing more resources on preventing future wars, and their human and financial costs, rather than on simply funding them.

The proposals and specific budget recommendations suggested below are meant to be illustrative rather than definitive. It is not a detailed blueprint providing a comprehensive analysis of the details of all the specific programs. Rather it is a broad outline showing the major elements of a unified security budget that incorporates nonmilitary tools into our security strategy and rebalances military forces for today's security challenges.

## **1. Rebalancing forces.**

More and more, the crises of the post-cold war world involve failed states that provide havens for terrorist groups while spreading regional instability. In the last decade, our forces have been deeply engaged in war-fighting and peacekeeping missions to secure order and hope in countries suffering from civil war and collapsed governments. Yet these peace operations have accounted for only about 2% of our defense expenditures over the last decade.

We have had a very mixed record thus far in dealing with such crises, moreover, partly because we have been unprepared for them. Peacekeeping and stability operations are not what America planned to do when we designed our armed forces during the Cold War. We will therefore rebalance our forces to gear a larger proportion of our military toward conducting small- and medium-scale interventions relevant to counterterrorism, and peacekeeping and stability operations.

This realignment will include a greater emphasis on:

- Investing in better strategic airlift capability including improving airfields abroad and replacing large forward-based troops with more mobile units that can be flown to crisis areas on short notice.
- Strengthened surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and improved communications.
- Increased numbers of special operations units, able to act in conjunction with those of our allies, and fully accountable to civilian oversight.
- Homeland defenses.
- New specialized units in both the active force and the reserves for peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and stability operations.

- Retraining much of the National Guard and Reserve forces and some active forces to specialize in homeland defense, counterterrorism, and protection against WMD.

The nature of today's threats also allows us to:

- *Reduce the pace of investment in the next generation of weapons.* The U.S. has a technological edge over all nations, including all of its adversaries. Nonetheless, the U.S. continues rushing expensive new generations of fighters, helicopters, ships, submarines, and tanks into production. Most of these weapons were designed to fight the now-collapsed Soviet Union. If the Pentagon adopted a more realistic buying strategy—emphasizing purchases of the current generation of weapons systems and upgrading them—it could actually modernize its force more rapidly at lower cost.

New technologies and systems will be developed and tested as prototypes, but they need not be manufactured in quantity unless the threat warrants it. It is simply a waste of money and other resources to keep a huge military force on hair-trigger readiness for the conflicts of the last century.

In addition, a more restrictive policy of exporting advanced aircraft and other weapons to potentially unstable regions would also help us to safely slow down the pace of developing future weapon systems.

- *Stop deployment of the national missile defense system until the technology is proven and the threat warrants,* while maintaining a robust research program. This would save billions of dollars and insure that America does not close the door on any promising technology. So far, despite spending over \$75 billion, we have not found any that works, and we cannot plan our security around doing so. Nor can we risk antagonizing Russia and China and possibly driving them into a military alliance, or alienating our European allies, or sparking a new nuclear arms race in Asia.
- *Reduce our expensive and largely redundant strategic nuclear arsenal* to 1,000 warheads, as a first step to further cuts; take our nuclear forces off hair-trigger alert.
- *Close unnecessary military bases.* While force structures and manpower have been reduced by 37% since the end of the Cold War, bases overseas have been reduced by only 25% and bases in the U.S. by only 20%. There is probably room for even larger reductions since in 1988, before the end of the Cold War, an official estimate put excess base capacity at 40%. After the end of the Cold War and the reduction of potential threat, presumably the excess capacity is now even greater.
- *Overhaul the Pentagon's financial management operations.* In 2003, the Defense Department (DoD) failed its General Accounting Office audit for the seventh year in a row. The DoD Inspector General found that it had failed to account for more than a *trillion* dollars in financial transactions, not to mention planes, tanks, and missile launchers. The Pentagon has about 2,200 overlapping financial systems, which cost \$18 billion a year to run.



The Bush administration has laid out a Defense Transformation initiative that is supposed to fix these problems. The positive features of this initiative—the ones that actually create new accountability and controls—should be pursued. The initiative has, however, embedded within it, proposals that will actually *weaken* accountability by reducing Pentagon reporting requirements to Congress and the public, while also weakening labor and environmental protections. These proposals need to go.

- *Realign forces* to better prepare them for likely missions, including counterterrorism, peacekeeping, reconstruction, security, and stability operations.

## 2. Neglected security tools.

The most important element missing from our current security policy is the community of other nations. The current go-it-alone approach of the U.S. has drained the reservoir of international support that overflowed following 9/11. Real diplomacy has been replaced with demands that other countries follow U.S. directives or get out of the way. It is hardly surprising that U.S. appeals for support for its Iraq policy have yielded such meager returns. The administration has, moreover, approached with suspicion and disdain virtually the entire architecture of international treaties and norms painstakingly built since World War II. The result is that the U.S. has only the forces of its military arsenal to apply to the problems of controlling the spread of dangerous weapons and armed aggression.

Rather than squander our power by single-handedly deploying our forces on missions abroad, we should use it to build stronger and more durable alliances and institutions. A greater emphasis on cooperation will provide a stronger foundation, and more tools, for conflict prevention. It will also discourage the formation of countervailing coalitions, and make sure that if and when diplomacy fails, there is a shared vision on which to launch an enforcement action. And it will allow us to share the human, political, and financial costs of the military burden rather than shouldering them alone. We have only to compare the financial cost of going it alone in Iraq—\$128 billion thus far and counting<sup>4</sup>—versus the minority share, about \$7 billion, that we paid to wage the Gulf War, to appreciate the virtues of working cooperatively with allies.

We must strengthen those measures that are currently being slighted—diplomacy, arms control treaties, cooperative threat reduction initiatives, and export controls—that work to check state proliferators and terrorist networks. Proposal highlights include:

- Reinvesting in diplomacy. We will refocus resources on diplomacy as preventive action to resolve conflicts before they become violent.
- Reinvigorating the nonproliferation regime. The first line of defense against the spread of WMD is the interlocking set of treaties and institutions that form the global nonproliferation regime. This must include:

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<sup>4</sup> *Funding For Defense, Military Operations, Homeland Security, And Related Activities Since 9-11*, Steven M. Kosiak, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Jan. 21, 2004.

*Expanding significantly the budget of the Nunn-Lugar program and other initiatives designed to help secure and dismantle the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, since this may be the most likely place for terrorists to get their hands on WMD.*

*Solidifying the norms against proliferation through multilateral regimes.* The U.S. must strengthen the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by ratifying an IAEA Additional Protocol permitting more rigorous inspections, asking for assurances that all states implement full-scope IAEA safeguards agreements, and proposing increases in that agency's funding. And we must ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which will create a more powerful nonproliferation tool through its intrusive verification regime.

*Working for more effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including an improved inspection system, and resume participation in meetings to develop a biological weapons protocol and strengthen verification and enforcement obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.*

*Ratifying the Small Arms Control Pact, the Antipersonnel Landmine Treaty, and the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court.*

*Strengthening existing export control authorities, focusing especially on regulating truly sensitive exports to hostile and unstable regimes.*

- Developing international security forces. The U.S. cannot meet every contingency by itself. The vain attempt to do so only stretches our resources and leaves us with inadequate forces. Nor can we simply recast outlaw states in our own image by threatening and using military force. This strategy breeds resentment, fosters countervailing coalitions, and overburdens our resources.

We must have effective U.S. military forces acting primarily in conjunction with other nations and international institutions so that burdens and risks are shared and every crisis does not become primarily an American responsibility. The international community still lacks a practical security design that would combine diplomatic efforts with effective international military forces. The founders of the UN in 1945 foresaw the organization's need to have a permanent standing force at its disposal. The U.S. needs to support the fulfillment of this long-delayed component of the UN charter. An interim step leading toward that goal would be to establish permanent rapid-reaction units drawn from a coalition of those powers able and willing to cooperate, providing the UN with more reliable access to well-trained and equipped international forces in times of crisis.

## Proposals for an Alternative National Security Budget

As noted above, the specific program budget levels suggested here are one illustration of how to rebalance the overall national security budget to better address today's threats. They make use of other expert analysis where available, but it is beyond the scope and intent of this report to develop detailed and definitive program analyses here.<sup>5</sup>

### REALIGNING THE U.S. MILITARY

The wars in Afghanistan and especially Iraq have reaffirmed that the U.S. military is unmatched in conventional combat. It already has fielded numerous types of equipment that can spot enemy targets under a wide range of environmental conditions, can communicate that information quickly to many types of U.S. units, and can attack those targets with a variety of accurate munitions. Incremental improvements can be pursued to make this process ever wider, faster, and more accurate, but the broad capability is already there, and the basic implications of this capability for tactics have been thought through.

The Iraq intervention, however—or rather the political mess left in its wake—has also shown how ill-prepared the military is for missions such as occupation, security and peacekeeping, and how adversaries will learn to avoid our overwhelming strength and attack where we are not so strong. The implication of U.S. conventional military might, combined with unconventional conflict weakness, is clear: The priority for our military should not be another generation of expensive aircraft, ships, and missiles designed to combat a superpower, but rather the basic equipment and skills needed to counter adversaries who have less technologically-advanced equipment, but intense commitment to their struggle.

The new generation of weapon “platforms” is both only marginally relevant to today's complex political conflicts and exceedingly costly. Reducing, and in some cases canceling, these programs while preserving basic military research and development (R&D) can free tens of billions of dollars annually that can then be applied to military and nonmilitary programs that will do more to make us secure. As this report was going to press, the administration abruptly decided to cancel the Army's long-running *Comanche* helicopter program, as called for here. It remains to be seen whether much of the program and funding will continue under different names, but the administration has again acknowledged the low relevance of a major weapon program.

The most obvious candidates for reductions are the weapon platforms—vehicles, aircraft, ships—but there are many other programs designed to develop ever-faster battlefield targeting, communication, and striking hardware that should be lower-priority than programs that address actual, current threats. Additional savings can be achieved in the future by closing unneeded military bases and facilities in the United States and reforming the large but ineffective Defense

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<sup>5</sup> The methodology for deriving budget recommendations was to add or subtract from annual program funding (average levels, rather than a specific budget year) according to the specific proposal to reduce, cancel, or increase the relevant program.

Department accounting system. Recent estimates of savings in these areas are not available, so the table below does not include them.

<b>Proposed Military Program Changes</b>	
	Annual change in funding, billions of dollars
Prepare for new missions	+ 5
F/A-22 <i>Raptor</i> fighter	- 4.0
<i>Virginia</i> -class submarine	- 2.1
<i>Comanche</i> helicopter	- 1.4
DDX destroyer	- 2.0
Future Combat System	- 0.7
Nuclear warhead maintenance	- 3.2
Nuclear weapons	- 1.5
Missile defense	- 8
Army Guard divisions	- 4
R&D	- 22
NATO force	- 7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>- 51</b>

**Prepare for New Missions** – *Improve capabilities for peacekeeping, stability, and counterterrorist missions*

Improving U.S. military forces' equipment, doctrine, training, and exercises for peacekeeping, security-building, and similar semi-hostile deployments can raise their readiness for, and success at, such newly-common missions. These types of operations require a small shift in the composition of forces towards more military police, civil affairs, special forces, logistics, engineering, medical and intelligence units, and the addition of regional and foreign language specialists to those units. In order to ensure rapid deployment without maintaining a high-visibility and irritating presence in foreign countries, transportation capabilities also need to be expanded.

The occupation of Iraq has illustrated unmet basic equipment needs for security and stability operations. National Guard and Reserve forces in particular may need equipment upgrades. Troops now have to add their own improvised armor protection for Humvee vehicles while

awaiting official equipment.<sup>6</sup> Even the new Stryker armored vehicles, intended for these missions, must be hurriedly modified for better protection.<sup>7</sup> At least 10 helicopters have been shot down in Iraq, yet many helicopters lack advanced countermeasures against missiles.<sup>8</sup> A \$324 million supplemental request for “urgent” items for Marines deploying to Iraq in 2004 included things like body armor, vehicle protection kits, and communications equipment, generators, shelters, and radios.<sup>9</sup> An estimated \$5 billion extra per year could help address all of these needs and preparations for new missions.

**F/A-22 Raptor Aircraft** – *Cancel and buy existing upgraded aircraft*

The winner of the prize for single most irrelevant weapon program, the F/A-22 is a fighter aircraft that has long been sold primarily on the promise of being harder to detect on radar than existing aircraft. The Taliban, al Qaeda, Iraqi Baathists, and many other adversaries do not have anti-aircraft radar installations, let alone jet fighters for the F/A-22 to counter. The Air Force, trying to justify a program whose overwhelming purpose (air-to-air combat against high-tech aircraft) has sharply receded, has recently added a whole new mission to try to make it relevant to today’s world: bombing. Using the world’s most expensive fighter for bombing, however, is not cost-effective. Highly upgraded and effective aircraft such as the Block 60 version of the F-16 can be purchased to prevent excessive aging of the aircraft fleet. Savings from canceling the F/A-22 and buying cheaper aircraft would be approximately \$4 billion per year.<sup>10</sup> If further funding is necessary, many more of the inexpensive F-16s could be obtained by further slowing the hurried F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.<sup>11</sup>

**SSN-774 Virginia-class Submarine** – *Reduce purchases and stop retiring existing submarines early*

This submarine was intended to combat future submarines that the former Soviet Union will never build. It is not clear that a large fleet of nuclear attack submarines are really needed for the few remaining missions of inserting small special forces teams and launching cruise missiles, given the limited occasions for using over-the-beach special forces, alternative delivery means and the high cost of nuclear submarines. Nevertheless, the planned 55-boat fleet can be maintained by halting the practice of retiring highly capable *Los Angeles*-class submarines early, basing submarines closer to their areas of operation, and buying 10 rather than 21 *Virginia*-class submarines. Savings would be \$2.1 billion per year.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> “Troops Add Improvised Armor to Humvees,” Marni McEntee, *European Stars and Stripes*, Feb. 3, 2004.

<sup>7</sup> “Is Stryker Prepared for the Task in Iraq?” Tom Squitieri, *USA Today*, Sept. 29, 2003.

<sup>8</sup> “Army Digs in on Copter-Defense System,” Rowan Scarborough, *Washington Times*, Jan. 21, 2004, p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> “Navy Submits \$324 Million ‘Urgent’ Request To OSD To Pay For OIF II,” Malina Brown, *Inside The Navy*, Feb. 16, 2004, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> Estimate of annual savings based on FY 2005 request of \$4.7 billion for the F/A-22, less a purchase of the same number of F-16s (24) and some upgrades. Last major purchase price of F-16s in 2000 from *Procurement Programs (P-1)*, Department of Defense Amended Budget, Fiscal Year 2002, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2001, p. F-2. See also *Budget Options*, Congressional Budget Office, March 2003, p. 24.

<sup>11</sup> The CBO projected savings through 2013 from merely slowing the F-35 program could buy 750 F-16s at the price of the last substantial F-16 purchase in Fiscal Year 2000. *Budget Options*, Congressional Budget Office, March 2003, p. 25.

<sup>12</sup> From CBO average annual savings over ten years. *Budget Options*, Congressional Budget Office, March 2003, p. 17.

**RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter** – *Cancel and focus on UAVs*

This two decade-old helicopter program has been so poorly developed and managed that its technical problems and cost overruns have forced drastic alteration of the program several times, including a drop of hundreds of aircraft from the original planned purchase. The remaining primary mission of reconnaissance can be performed by the similarly-equipped but cheaper AH-64 *Apache* attack helicopters, upgraded *Kiowa* helicopters dedicated to reconnaissance, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the *Predator*. UAV development can be accelerated to perform more of the reconnaissance mission. In late February, the administration did wisely cancel this program. Savings will be \$1.4 billion per year.<sup>13</sup>

**DDX Destroyer** – *Replace with smaller ships*

The DDX destroyer program, while attempting to incorporate advanced technologies to reduce crew size and operational cost, is still aimed at producing a large, high-end ship, something more attuned to open-ocean warfare against a superpower than support of operations ashore in crowded, dangerous, close-in coastal areas. The DDX would be a substantially larger ship *than any existing U.S. cruisers and destroyers*.<sup>14</sup> The influential director of the Defense Department's Office of Force Transformation, Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, has promoted the advantages of smaller ships, such as his advanced "Streetfighter" concepts. Until such ships are developed, small but still highly capable frigates could similarly provide flexible capability in greater numbers than the DDX. The Congressional Budget Office has described an option that would buy frigates rather than the DDX. Canceling the 16 DDXs and buying 17 frigates instead would free \$2.0 billion a year for other uses.<sup>15</sup>

**Future Combat System** – *Slow the unrealistic program schedule*

The Future Combat System (FCS) is not fully defined yet, but is the Army's broad program for a wide variety of new ground and air vehicles linked together with advanced communications networks into an integrated combat system. Fielding is intended to begin by 2008, a schedule that many experts believe is too aggressive, given the program's ambitious goals. Delaying the planned fielding date by two years would be a more realistic timetable for a technologically risky program that is likely to slip anyway; the delay would save around \$700 million a year.<sup>16</sup>

**Nuclear Warhead Maintenance** – *Reduce rebuilding of nuclear warheads*

During the height of the Cold War, the Department of Energy (DoE) spent \$3.8 billion per year on its full range of designing, testing, and manufacturing nuclear weapons.<sup>17</sup> Yet the current DoE plan is to spend around \$5 billion annually on its stockpile "stewardship" program. The administration does not plan to actually dismantle many of the warheads it is taking off deployed weapons status. In contrast, a program that carefully monitored nuclear warheads and took them

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<sup>13</sup> From CBO average annual savings over ten years. *Budget Options*, Congressional Budget Office, March 2003, p. 15.

<sup>14</sup> *Budget Options*, Congressional Budget Office, March 2003, p. 19.

<sup>15</sup> From CBO average annual savings over ten years. *Budget Options*, Congressional Budget Office, March 2003, p. 19.

<sup>16</sup> From CBO average annual savings over ten years. *Budget Options*, Congressional Budget Office, March 2003, p. 14.

<sup>17</sup> Figure is in 2000 dollars. *Managing the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile: A Comparison of Five Strategies*, Dr. Robert Civiak, Tri-Valley CAREs, July 2000, p. vii.

out of service as they slowly degraded in reliability, rather than constantly rebuilding them and designing new ones, would cost \$1.7 billion per year, saving about \$3.2 billion annually.<sup>18</sup>

### **Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems – Reduce strategic nuclear weapon deployment**

The U.S. still maintains an excessive nuclear force, given that a large-scale nuclear war with Russia is extremely unlikely. The continuing huge U.S. nuclear arsenal likely hampers U.S. credibility in trying to halt proliferation of other WMD, including chemical and biological weapons more accessible to poorer adversaries. The administration also appears to be willing to use nuclear weapons to attack suspected WMD sites, illustrated by its pursuit of programs such as the nuclear “bunker buster, which undercuts efforts to de-legitimize WMD. Funding for the bunker buster, starting out at \$50 million, but soon to grow, should be ended. The force of 500 *Minuteman* land-based missiles can be retired, and the fleet of nuclear missile submarines reduced from 14 to 10, fielding 1,000 warheads. Savings would be approximately \$1.55 billion a year.<sup>19</sup>

### **Missile Defense – Focus on short-range defense and limited national missile defense R&D**

The current program allocates too much funding to a program that addresses a low priority threat. Enemy nations could deliver WMD in many cheaper, more reliable, more accurate, more deniable ways than using intercontinental ballistic missiles. A large share of national missile defense funding can be used far more effectively for other tools to reduce or counter the threat of WMD. In addition, a slower pace can allow adequate time for testing and developing a very technologically challenging program. As much as \$8 billion a year could be obtained by substantially lowering the priority put on national missile defense, while still providing funding for some R&D and for shorter-range missile defense systems like the *Patriot PAC-3*.<sup>20</sup>

### **Army Guard Divisions – Reduce the Guard reserve force**

Seven of the eight National Guard combat divisions (which do not include 15 “enhanced separate brigades”) that were really intended to fight in the Cold War are not adequately trained and ready for quick deployment today.<sup>21</sup> Since they do not have an active role in war plans, the seven divisions can be demobilized while preserving one division and the 15 enhanced brigades, freeing approximately \$4 billion for higher priorities.<sup>22</sup> A comprehensive study by the National Defense University finds that there is no shortage of troops oriented towards peace, stability, security, and occupation operations, but that the relevant units are scattered throughout the force.

<sup>18</sup> Savings estimate from DoE Stockpile Stewardship Program costing \$4.9 billion per year versus a program of dismantling nuclear weapons as they wear out costing \$1.7 billion per year. *Managing the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile: A Comparison of Five Strategies*, Dr. Robert Civiak, Tri-Valley CAREs, July 2000.

<sup>19</sup> Estimate from “The Hunt for Small Potatoes: Savings in Nuclear Deterrence Forces,” David Mosher, in *Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Cindy Williams, ed., MIT Press, 2001, p. 132. In 1998, annual spending on the U.S. nuclear force was estimated at \$19 billion, according to *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940*, Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Brookings Institution, 1998.

<sup>20</sup> Figure based on preserving \$2 billion of the \$10 billion a year program for short, medium, and long range missile defenses. A \$744 billion 2002-35 procurement cost is estimated in *The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense*, Economists Allied for Arms Reduction and Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, January 2003.

<sup>21</sup> “Overpaying the Pentagon; How we can meet our security needs for less than \$500 billion,” Lawrence Korb, *American Prospect*, Sept. 1, 2003.

<sup>22</sup> Savings estimate from “Overpaying the Pentagon; How we can meet our security needs for less than \$500 billion,” Lawrence Korb, *American Prospect*, Sept. 1, 2003.

The study suggested designating two new divisions oriented toward “stability and reconstruction” missions, but filling them with existing active and reserve troops.<sup>23</sup>

### **Weapon and Equipment Research and Development – Restore a justifiable funding level**

The Bush administration used the attacks of 9/11 to justify a rapid increase in military spending. The budget category that received the largest boost from FY 2002 to 2004 was, strangely, R&D, the least urgent category given the commencement of three wars—Afghanistan, Iraq, and the “global war on terrorism.” Although defeating terrorists and overthrowing governments that aid them depends largely on having ready, well-trained and well-maintained force now, rather than on developing more high-tech weaponry for the future, the R&D budget has jumped almost \$30 billion per year above the level sustained during the latter part of the 1990s.<sup>24</sup>

There is undoubtedly some useful research to be done on new equipment and weapons designed specifically for detecting and attacking terrorists, but these types of products do not generally require the huge levels of funding that items such as aircraft for superpower war require. The R&D budget is now substantially more than was spent in the 1980s at the peak of the Cold War high-tech arms race with the Soviet Union, even taking inflation into account.<sup>25</sup> R&D can safely be restored to \$35 billion annually, just above the 1960–89 Cold War average of \$34.0 billion (in today’s dollars). Counterterrorism operations do not justify a level of R&D spending far in excess of what was spent during the Cold War when the U.S. was in an all-out arms race with the Soviet Union and fighting a major land war in Vietnam. Spending \$35 billion annually would amount to a cut of around \$22 billion from the \$69 billion FY 2005 request, after reductions for specific weapons that are counted separately.

### **NATO – Make fuller use of NATO military capabilities**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally focused exclusively on the Cold War defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union, but it has now expanded its mission outside of Europe. It is even commanding a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, a fundamental break with the past. Much of the NATO standing force in Europe is still oriented to the Cold War, and can be demobilized or transformed in order to focus resources and attention on more relevant missions. After shrinking in size, NATO could serve as a useful mechanism for conducting multilateral deployments when an intervention is valid enough to gain international support.

In October 2003, NATO activated a “NATO Response Force” that will grow to 21,000 personnel by 2006, including a brigade-size ground force, special operations units, a naval task force, and fighter aircraft, plus the support units needed to deploy it and sustain it.<sup>26</sup> The force was brought together in part because of a proposal from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who appears to have wanted to create a multinational force more closely linked to the U.S., in contrast to the Europe-only intervention force being created independently by several NATO nations. If a national

<sup>23</sup> *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., National Defense University, Nov. 12, 2003.

<sup>24</sup> \$40.4 billion per year average 1994–2000 outlays (in constant 2004 dollars), up to a FY 2005 budget request of \$68.9 billion. *National Defense Budget Estimates for 2004*, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2003, and *Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, Historical Tables*, p. 85.

<sup>25</sup> *National Defense Budget Estimates for 2004*, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), pp. 132–3.

<sup>26</sup> *The NATO Response Force – NRF*, [http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape\\_nrf/nrf\\_intro.htm](http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm), Nov. 21, 2003.



security strategy of deliberately and actively using allied forces is followed, this NATO force could allow the U.S. to reduce its ground forces by a division (given that normally a rotation base of three or four brigades is used to provide a single ready-to-deploy brigade) and its air forces by an air wing. This would free up approximately \$7 billion.<sup>27</sup>

Taking greater advantage of our allies' strengths is certainly an option. NATO currently has 1.5 million troops in its active duty ground forces alone, besides U.S. forces. It has 5 million military personnel overall—active and reserve, from all its services, apart from the U.S. contributions. Non-U.S. NATO equipment includes 13,000 tanks, 35,000 armored infantry vehicles, and 11,000 aircraft. NATO countries besides the U.S. spend close to \$200 billion every year on their militaries.<sup>28</sup> If a major initiative is undertaken to shed unnecessary forces, free up funding, transform even a small fraction of these units into a modern, well-equipped mobile force, and expand the NATO Response Force beyond current plans, more U.S. forces could be demobilized—an additional division and air wing as a potential first step.

### ADDRESSING SECURITY DEFICITS

<b>Proposed Nonmilitary Program Changes</b>		increased annual funding, billions of dollars
<b>International Affairs Programs</b>		
	Nonproliferation programs	1.5
	Diplomatic operations	2
	Economic development aid	10
	U.S. international communication	1.2
	U.S. contributions to UN/regional peace operations	0.5
	UN civilian police force	0.2
	International organizations	0.1
<b>Homeland Security Programs</b>		
	Increase emergency responder preparation	20
	Double Coast Guard and Border Patrol programs	11
	Increase port container inspection, tenfold	5
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>52</b>

<sup>27</sup> Savings based on an inflation-adjusted approximate annual costs of \$4 billion for a division and \$2.7 billion for a full air wing, from *Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New Order*, William Kaufmann and John Steinbruner, Brookings, 1991.

<sup>28</sup> "Vital Statistics: The U.S. Military," *Defense Monitor*, v. 32, no. 5, Center for Defense Information, December 2003.

Funding for the diplomatic, economic, and informational tools of national security, and for mobilizing and strengthening international action to increase global security, is being squeezed by sharply increased military spending. Re-allocating funding to the following programs can help restore the balance.

### **THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET**

The U.S. international affairs budget needs to be viewed as part of the overall national security budget, since building solid international partnerships to address the causes of conflict is cost-effective “preventive medicine” that reduces the need for expensive military responses later. The percentage of the U.S. budget devoted to international affairs has been declining for four decades. Despite last year’s increase for HIV-AIDS through the Millennium Challenge Account, international affairs spending accounts for only slightly more than 1% of the U.S. discretionary budget. Unacceptable tradeoffs are the result: forced choices between secure embassies and modern communications systems for diplomats or adequate funding for peacekeeping, and between adequate funding for the Middle East peace process, or safeguarding nuclear weapons and materials in Russia. Increases, as outlined, need to be made to both parts of the international affairs budget: to the State Department budget, which includes the cost of U.S. diplomacy and U.S. assessed contributions to international organizations and peacekeeping, and to the foreign operations budget, which includes bilateral development and humanitarian aid. The U.S. is the least generous among all major donor countries in development assistance as a portion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The aid budget, in addition to being increased, needs to be redirected to focus most of its resources on countries most in need.

### **Nonproliferation Programs**

A key approach to increasing security is to try to constrain the new opportunities afforded to terrorist groups by the effects of globalization – to prevent them from obtaining particularly powerful weapons, such as nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons and materials. Nonproliferation programs may significantly raise the barrier to mounting WMD attacks on the United States. The programs include efforts to help secure materials and knowledge around the world, and particularly in Russia, that could be used for WMD attacks if obtained by hostile groups.

An initially-skeptical Bush administration has become a convert to the value of many of these programs. In December 2001, the president released a statement after a long agency review saying that “Most U.S. programs to assist Russia in threat reduction and nonproliferation work well, are focused on priority tasks and are well managed” – a level of endorsement of a government program that is quite rare in Washington.<sup>29</sup>

This endorsement has not however been matched by the commitment to financing it. Funding in the 2005 budget request for all non-proliferation programs, in both the Energy and Defense Departments, does slightly exceed the threshold of \$1 billion per year set at the G-8 Summit in 2002. The administration has also proposed expanding the mandate of the centerpiece nonproliferation program, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, to include other countries beyond the former Soviet states. But it provides no new money to do so. Indeed it has actually cut CTR’s budget from the 2004 level of \$450 million to \$409 million.

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<sup>29</sup> Mike Allen, “Bush Pledges More Aid for Russian Arms Cuts,” *Washington Post*, Dec. 28, 2001.

In 2001 the bipartisan Baker-Cutler commission set what is still the unmet standard for these programs, calling for spending \$30 billion over ten years on nuclear weapons and materials in Russia alone.<sup>30</sup> Increasing funding by about \$1.5 billion annually would meet that goal.

### **Diplomatic Operations**

In December 2002, eight former national security advisers from both parties argued for a substantial increase in the overall “international affairs” budget, which includes development assistance, security assistance, funding for the Department of State and other U.S. agencies working in foreign affairs, foreign information programs, and international financial programs. On funding for diplomatic operations they noted, “Our diplomats will play a critical role in assembling coalitions that will defeat global terrorist organizations, and they need the tools to do the job. They need secure embassies, capable telecommunications, adequate staffing, and robust public broadcasting facilities to spread America’s message of freedom and democracy around the globe.” They proposed a 30% overall increase that would restore funding to the peak levels of the Reagan era.<sup>31</sup> Applying that rate to diplomatic operations would raise spending by around \$2 billion a year.

### **Economic Development Assistance**

In a 2002 speech, President Bush identified development assistance as a security tool:

“ . . . persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair. And when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror. In Afghanistan, persistent poverty and war and chaos created conditions that allowed a terrorist regime to seize power. And in many other states around the world, poverty prevents governments from controlling their borders, policing their territory, and enforcing their laws. Development provides the resources to build hope and prosperity, and security.”<sup>32</sup>

Yet his 2005 budget request cuts nearly \$400 million from the seven key humanitarian and development accounts which fund U.S. bilateral and multilateral contributions for humanitarian, health, education and other development programs. The international community agreed in 1970 on a target for official development assistance of 0.7% of national income. For the U.S. that would be \$75 billion.<sup>33</sup> Yet in the 2005 budget, proposed U.S. nonmilitary foreign assistance amounts to \$13 billion. Five European nations have surpassed the 0.7% goal; four more are past 0.33%.<sup>34</sup> As an interim goal, the U.S. could increase aid by \$10 billion.

Increased funding alone is not enough, however. To be effective, these increases must be accompanied by key reforms in U.S. development policy. Reducing animosity around the world toward the U.S. requires redirecting development assistance in the following ways: 1) de-

<sup>30</sup> *A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia*, Task Force on DOE Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, Jan. 10, 2001.

<sup>31</sup> Letter from Frank Carlucci, Richard Allen, Samuel Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, William Clark, Henry Kissinger, Anthony Lake, Brent Scowcroft, to Condoleezza Rice, Dec. 20, 2002, at <http://www.usgloballeadership.org/details.cfm?id=96&section=International%20Affairs%20Budget>.

<sup>32</sup> Remarks by the President on Global Development, Inter-American Development Bank, March 14, 2002, White House Office of the Press Secretary.

<sup>33</sup> 2003 GDP from *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2004*, DoD Comptroller.

<sup>34</sup> Post-Monterrey Development Aid Report Card, UN, at <http://www.un.org/ga/58/plenary/oda2.html>.

emphasize U.S. strategic advantage in the targeting of aid, and emphasize the poorest of the poor; 2) remove rules requiring aid to flow through U.S. corporations; 3) reduce debt burdens that now have developing countries paying more in debt service than they receive in aid; and 4) advance a trade policy that would level the playing field by eliminating the dumping of U.S. goods on markets in the developing world.

### **U.S. International Communication**

Public diplomacy includes educational and cultural exchanges, academic programs, broadcasting, and language training. The budget for these purposes has been slashed since the 1960s and 1970s. A bipartisan advisory group on public diplomacy formed in June 2003 concluded that this governmental function is seriously underfunded.<sup>35</sup> Doubling the current funding level of approximately \$1.2 billion would address the problem. Spending for this purpose must emphasize programs that promote real *dialogue* between Americans and the rest of the world over those that simply seek to *promote* the U.S. around the world. Repairing America's international relations will necessarily involve showing that we know how to listen.

### **U.S. Contributions to UN and Regional Organization Peacekeeping**

U.S. support for peacekeeping consists of assessed contributions to UN operations and voluntary contributions to multilateral operations conducted by sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The overall responsibilities of international peacekeeping operations have greatly expanded and become much more complex since the end of the Cold War. Yet U.S. funding for peacekeeping operations in recent years has failed to keep pace. The 2005 budget request actually cuts U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping by \$50 million, despite new operations anticipated in the coming year.

Besides chronic underfunding, existing peace operations have to function as ad hoc coalitions without sufficient joint training or fully interoperable weapons systems. A remedy was outlined by the UN Charter: a standing, fully-integrated UN peacekeeping force. Domestic political support for such a force does not currently exist, however. In the absence of such support, the U.S. should undertake the following six interim measures to improve UN and regional peacekeeping capability and support them with a \$500 million increase in annual funding.

- 1) UN headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the UN and as such its staff should be funded from the regular UN budget, rather than, as currently, in allocations to a separate peacekeeping budget. This will increase the UN's ability to plan and manage operations, while reducing U.S. expenses from the current 27% assessment for peacekeeping down to the 22% assessed for the regular budget.
- 2) At the same time, the current U.S. policy of zero nominal growth in the UN's regular budget should be repealed and replaced with a policy based upon sound fiscal

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<sup>35</sup> *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World*, The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, October 2003. The group included Amb. Edward P. Djerejian, chairman, Amb. David M. Abshire, Dr. Stephen P. Cohen, Amb. Diana Lady Dougan, Mamoun Fandy, James K. Glassman, Dr. Malik M. Hasan, Dr. Farhad Kazemi, Judith Milestone, Harold C. Pachios, George R. Salem, Dr. Shibley Telhami, and John Zogby.

management that would allow for changes in the organization's budget to reflect its evolving responsibilities such as counterterrorism, peace operations and UN reforms.

- 3) The U.S. should fully support improvements in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System, the voluntary listing of national capacities that the UN can turn to for organized units, personnel, and logistical support for peacekeeping operations and in doing so list at least one brigade-level force as available for rapid deployment for UN peacekeeping operations.
- 4) Since one of the biggest obstacles to effective deployment of UN operations is logistics and enabling forces, the U.S. should also repeal the legislated limit of \$3 million in in-kind military support to any UN-authorized peace operation per year.
- 5) The U.S. should increase its support for regional training and integration with regional and subregional organizations to enable more effective deployments to potential crisis spots given the range of different national elements operating under UN command.
- 6) The U.S. should support and develop the UN's capacity for anticipating, planning, and managing operations so that international early warning systems can be developed to provide analysis and intelligence before a crisis occurs.

### **UN Civilian Police Corps**

While the political obstacles to a UN standing military force are daunting, more support exists for a standing UN Civilian Police Corps to restore the rule of law and ensure public safety in post-conflict societies and failed states. Such a force would be designed to address both the short-term need to fill the security gap left by inadequate local capacity, and the long-term goal of rebuilding the indigenous security sector. This is the crucial work that national military forces are neither equipped nor inclined to do.<sup>36</sup> An estimated one-year start-up cost of \$700 million would establish a brigade-strength force of 5,000 police officers equipped with light armored transport, protective gear, and weapons. Standing capacity would require a base and an operational headquarters, as well as provisions for a mobile field headquarters. Costs would be substantially lower than those for a military force equipped for robust operations.<sup>37</sup> A U.S. 27% share of a \$700 million cost estimate would amount to \$189 million.

### **International Organizations**

There is little debate that support for the U.S. around the world has declined drastically since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. Nowhere have the costs of U.S. unilateralism been clearer than in Iraq. The urgent task of repairing the tattered relations between the U.S. and the rest of the world argues for a strong, demonstrated recommitment to the fabric of international institutions.<sup>38</sup> The 2005 budget request does include a substantial increase in its largest account for International Organizations. This increase is misleading, however; most of it is attributable to two factors: a commendable decision to rejoin the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the weakness of the dollar, requiring greater nominal amounts just to keep pace.

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<sup>36</sup> *UN Civilian Police: Problems and Issues, Partnership for Effective Peace Operations*, [www.effectivepeacekeeping.org](http://www.effectivepeacekeeping.org), January 2004.

<sup>37</sup> Estimate by Peter Langille, Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria and author, *Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap: A Review of Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment*, Centre for UN Reform Education, 2002.

<sup>38</sup> See also Richard N. Gardner, "The One Percent Solution: Shirking the Cost of World Leadership," *Foreign Affairs*, July/ August 2000, pp. 2–11.

One of the most urgent priorities is increased funding for the IAEA. While the United States' Iraq Survey Group, set up by the Bush administration post-Iraq war and led by David Kay, has been spending \$100 million a *month* (futilely) seeking WMD in one country, the IAEA is responsible for conducting nuclear inspections around the entire world on a total budget of approximately \$268 million a *year*. Curbing nuclear proliferation is rightly one of the administration's highest security priorities; increasing the U.S. contribution to the IAEA by \$100 million would be consistent with that goal.

## HOMELAND SECURITY

Although President Bush's FY 2005 budget increases homeland security funding somewhat, certain key priorities are neglected. Department of Homeland Security funding for emergency responders in small- and medium-sized cities, for example, is cut by 46%. Overall federal homeland security-related funding for police drops from \$4.9 billion to \$3.3 billion.<sup>39</sup> Despite the establishment of a new cabinet department, the U.S. remains woefully vulnerable to terrorist attacks. According to a Brookings Institution study in early 2003, many steps taken already "reflect a response to past tactics of al Qaeda, not an anticipation of possible future innovations in how that organization or other terrorist groups might try to harm Americans." The report called for urgently

". . . filling the gaps that remain in the current homeland security effort. These range from creation of a new networked intelligence capability that tries to anticipate and prevent future terrorist actions, to greater protections for private infrastructure like chemical plants and skyscrapers, to a much stronger Coast Guard and Customs service (within DHS)."<sup>40</sup>

A 2003 Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, chaired by former Senator Warren Rudman, focused specifically on emergency response to a catastrophic attack and found that "[i]f the nation does not take immediate steps to better identify and address the urgent needs of emergency responders, the next terrorist incident could have an even more devastating impact than the Sept. 11 attacks."<sup>41</sup> The Task Force called for increasing spending on police, fire, medical, and other first responders approximately \$100 billion over five years, which would also have substantial immediate benefits for day-to-day emergency response unrelated to terrorist attacks.

In addition, increasing funding for other homeland security programs can help prevent successful attacks in the first place, such as doubling Coast Guard and Border Patrol programs, and increasing port container inspections tenfold.

<sup>39</sup> "Local Police Brace for 'Tremendous Cuts' in Federal Grants," *CQ Homeland Security*, Feb. 17, 2004.

<sup>40</sup> The report called for a \$7–10 billion increase in funding. *Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On*, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David L. Gunter, James M. Lindsay, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, James B. Steinberg, Brookings Institution, January 2003, pp. 2, 7.

<sup>41</sup> *Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared*, Independent Task Force on Emergency Responders, Council on Foreign Relations, June 2003.

## **CONCLUSION**

Americans, like the citizens of other nations, want their government to spend what it takes to make them safe. But they are equally worried about preserving their quality of life at home. The major escalations of the U.S. military budget in recent years, exacerbated by increases for current military operations, and compounded by a series of major tax cuts, has increased the pressure on spending for our citizens' education, health care, environmental protection, social security, and other public services. It is also ballooning a budget deficit that threatens to mortgage our children's and even grandchildren's future.

This proposed security budget will fund a restructured defense policy that provides America with the tools we need to meet the challenges of the new age. Currently we are wasting large sums on the wrong forces for the wrong occasions. It is a mistake to believe that increasing the Pentagon budget alone will guarantee our safety. The strategy outlined by this plan will transform our military into an institution better suited to deal with the new problems of the post-Cold War world and will at the same time leave us with an effective residual capability for conventional military action. It also refocuses resources on diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and the capacity for effective actions to prevent conflicts from turning into wars—and on using multilateral approaches to resolve conflicts when they escalate to war.

Our armed services, combined with those of our allies abroad, and a broad spectrum of nonmilitary security tools, will multiply the successes of our efforts to secure the blessings of peace and freedom. The methods will be different from those of the past, but the result will be a safer future for America and, through cooperation in the common interest, for the rest of the world.

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John Zavales served in a variety of assignments in the Department of Defense from 1989 to 2001. He was responsible for management and oversight of DOD humanitarian activities in Kosovo following the end of the war. He next served as the desk officer for a number of Balkan and Central European countries, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Since leaving government service he has been an independent consultant and commentator, on issues relating to humanitarian assistance, Balkan security, and defense policy.